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CORPORATIONS - FIDUCIARY DUTY OF MAJORITY
SHAREHOLDERS - HAS SPRING ARRIVED FOR THE FRO-
ZEN OUT MINORITY? Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Inves-
tors & RGI Holding Co., 533 F. Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982).
Twenty Seven Trust (Twenty Seven) owned a minority interest in
Realty 'Growth Investors (Realty). American Invesco Corporation
formed RGI Holding Company (RGI) as part of a plan to acquire Re-
alty. ' RGI then proceeded to make a tender offer for the Realty stock.
2
Through this tender offer, RGI obtained over ninety percent of the Re-
alty stock, leaving Twenty Seven as the only minority shareholder.
RGI then used its controlling interest to force Realty to merge into
RGI.3 When the two corporations merged, Twenty Seven was to re-
ceive cash for its minority interest in Realty.4 Twenty Seven objected
to this plan, charging that RGI was attempting to freeze out5 Twenty
Seven's minority interest in Realty by making a grossly inadequate
cash offer and by failing to consider the federal tax loss carryforward6
created by losses incurred by Realty in previous years.' Twenty Seven
filed suit' claiming the actions by RGI as Realty's majority shareholder
amounted to a breach of fiduciary duty.9 Judge Miller, writing for the
1. Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors & RGI Holding Co., 533 F.
Supp. 1028, 1030 (D. Md. 1982).
2. Id The offer stated that if less than 100 percent of the stock was tendered, RGI
would consider a merger with Realty to eliminate any minority interest.
3. Id at 1031-32.
4. Id at 1032.
5. Because the terms freeze out, squeeze out, and cash out are essentially synony-
mous, they will be treated under the heading of freeze out. See Brudney &
Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978).
Brudney & Chirelstein describe a freeze out as follows:
The essence of a freezeout is the displacement of public investors by
those who own a controlling block of stock of a corporation, whether
individuals or a parent company, for cash or senior securities. The pub-
lic investors are thus required to give up their equity in the enterprise,
while the controllers retain theirs. Freezeouts most commonly take the
form of a merger of a corporation into its existing parent or into a shell
corporation newly formed for the purpose by those who control the
merged entity.
Id at 1357.
6. See 26 I.R.C. § 172 (1976 & Supp. V 1981). A tax loss carryforward permits a
taxpayer to carry losses forward to future taxable years.
7. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1030.
8. Id at 1032. Although in its five count amended complaint Twenty Seven alleged
violations of section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Securities
and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5, breach of a common law fiduciary duty
by the majority shareholders, common law fraud in connection with the proxy
materials, violation of the Maryland Securities Act, and unlawful shareholder dis-
crimination, this casenote will be confined to the allegation of breach of fiduciary
duty by the majority shareholders.
9. Id The essence of the Twenty Seven complaint was directed at RGI as the new
majority shareholder, not as the selling majority shareholder of Realty. Id Had
Twenty Seven claimed a breach of fiduciary duty by the selling majority share-
holder of Realty, Twenty Seven would have had to prove that the majority could
foresee a fraud upon the minority. Claggett v. Hutchinson, 583 F.2d 1259, 1262
Baltimore Law Review
United States District Court for the District of Maryland, held that
Maryland would recognize a claim for breach of fiduciary duty under
these circumstances and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss.'"
Theoretically, a corporation functions as a miniature democracy."
Thus, to a certain extent majority rule is encouraged and permitted. A
system of majority rule always involves some degree of coercion, and
therefore there are times when the minority must accept the unfavora-
ble consequences of the majority vote. The system of majority rule
presumes that the majority and minority have a common goal with a
difference of opinion on how to accomplish that goal. The validity of
this presumption may be questioned, however, when the majority acts
for a selfish benefit without any corresponding benefit to the corpora-
tion or the minority shareholders.
In an early United States Supreme Court case, Southern Pacfc Co.
v. Bogert, 12 the Southern Pacific Company sought to exclude the mi-
nority shareholders of the Houston & Texas Central Railway Company
from participating in the new Houston Company formed under a reor-
ganization plan. Under the reorganization plan, the Southern Pacific
Company got all of the stock in the new Houston Company and the
minority shareholders received nothing.' 3 The Supreme Court recog-
nized the inequities of a reorganization plan which gave all of the stock
to the majority shareholder, and imposed a constructive trust upon the
stock held by the Southern Pacific Company.' 4 The Court held that the
majority shareholder did not have an unlimited right of control to the
detriment of the minority.'5
Thus, the Supreme Court has recognized that a fiduciary duty is
owed to the minority shareholder whenever the majority shareholder
(4th Cir. 1978). The allegations in Twenty Seven are substantially different from
those in Claggett and any broad reading of Claggett indicating the majority never
owes the minority shareholders a fiduciary duty would seem to be incorrect. See
Note, Corporations - Fiduciary Duty - Circumstances Held Not Sufflcienty Sus-
picious to Invoke Majority Stockholder's Duty to Investigate Purchasers Prior to
Sale of Stock, 8 U. BALT. L. REv. 341 (1979).
10. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039 (defendant's motion was made under
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) - failure to state a claim upon which relief may be
granted).
11. See H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS §§ 186-202 (2d ed.
1970).
12. 250 U.S. 483 (1919).
13. Id at 486.
14. Id at 487-88.
15. Id In regard to the rights of the majority shareholders, the Court stated:
The majority has the right to control; but when it does so, it occupies a
fiduciary relation toward the minority, as much as the corporation itself
or its officers and directors. If through that control a sale of the corporate
property is made and the property is acquired by the majority, the mi-
nority may not be excluded from a fair participation in the fruits of the
sale.
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uses its right to control. 6 According to the Supreme Court in Southern
Pacfic the majority would be accountable to the minority shareholders
for a breach of fiduciary duty in a manner similar to an officer or direc-
tor of a corporation being accountable to all of the shareholders.' 7
Although the Supreme Court's opinion in Southern Pacfic has not
been widely applied, many state courts have reasoned that the majority
shareholders owe the minority shareholders a fiduciary duty.'" The
first courts to recognize a fiduciary duty did so in the context of a judi-
cially recognized close corporation.' 9 The courts imposed a fiduciary
duty on the majority shareholders because of the lack of alternative
remedies available to the minority shareholders in a close corpora-
tion.20 Later, state court opinions expanded this concept of fiduciary
duty to apply to all controlling shareholders in all corporations.21
Because the claim for breach of fiduciary duty by a controlling
shareholder in Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors & RGI
Holding Co. 22 was one of first impression in Maryland, the district
court sua sponte raised the issue of whether Maryland would recognize
such a claim.23 Judge Miller began by reasoning that the conduct of
Realty and RGI was tantamount to a short form merger.24 After sur-
veying the case law of other jurisdictions to determine whether use of a
short form merger might amount to a breach of fiduciary duty, the
court concluded that the Maryland courts would recognize such a claim
in this limited factual setting, and that a majority shareholder breaches
his fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder either when he acts with-
out a legitimate business purpose or when the transaction is unfair to
16. Id.; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939). In that case the Court stated:
[The majority stockholder's] dealings with the corporation are subjected
to. . . scrutiny and where any of their contracts or engagements with
the corporation are challenged the burden is on the director or stock-
holder not only to prove the good faith of the transaction but also to
show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the corporation and
those interested therein.
Id 306.
17. Southern Pac/ifc Co., 250 U.S. at 487-88. A director must act in the best interests
of the corporation relying on his business judgment. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981).
18. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981); Wilkes v. Spr-
ingside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981);
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505
(1975).
20. See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 367 Mass. 578, 328
N.E.2d 505, 514 (1975).
21. See, e.g., Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
22. 533 F: Supp. 1028 (D. Md. 1982).
23. Id at 1039.
24. Id at 1034; see also MD. CoRPs. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 3-106 (1975 & Supp.
1983). A short form merger occurs when a small corporation merges into a large
corporation which already owns ninety percent of the small corporation's stock.
Id
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the minority interest.25
The merger technique applied in Twenty Seven Trust is often re-
ferred to as going private. In this type of merger the majority share-
holder is seeking to eliminate public ownership of the corporation by
25. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039. In regard to what specifically consti-
tutes a breach of fiduciary duty the district court stated that a mere legitimate
business purpose is not sufficient to justify freezing out the minority - the merger
must also be fair with respect to the minority interest. Id Although Judge Miller
does not explain what this standard of fairness requires, in Delaware the fairness
standard seems to require a balancing of the effect of the transaction with the
benefit to the majority and minority interest. See Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar,
407 A.2d 1032, 1037 (Del. 1979); Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del.
1977). If, after weighing the benefits, the court feels the transaction is "fair" then
the majority has fulfilled its fiduciary duty. If, however, the majority receives a
great financial benefit while the minority receives no financial gain by the merger,
then the majority may have breached its fiduciary duty. In its complaint, Twenty
Seven alleged that the majority shareholder's sole purpose for the merger was to
deprive Twenty Seven of participation in the federal tax loss carryforward. Judge
Miller's refusal to grant the defendants' motion to dismiss seems to indicate that
exclusion of the minority interest from participation in a federal tax loss carryfor-
ward at least raises a rebuttable presumption that there was not a legitimate busi-
ness purpose and thus a breach of fiduciary duty. See Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F.
Supp. at 1039.
The legitimate business purpose test when applied in this way seems appro-
priate to regulate the behavior of majority shareholders. If the majority can show
a legitimate business purpose for the merger, then the merger should be permitted
despite any harm to the minority. As owner of the controlling interest, the major-
ity shareholder has the right to control the corporation. Southern Pacific Co. v.
Bogert, 250 U.S. 483, 487 (1919). However, the court must carefully scrutinize the
majority's actions to ensure there is a legitimate business purpose for the merger,
and not a contrived excuse to exclude the minority. Assuming the majority can
show such a purpose for the merger, then the effect on the minority becomes a
secondary concern.
There are some purposes, however, which may benefit the majority share-
holder but should not be considered legitimate. See United Funds v. Carter Prod-
ucts, Inc., FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 91, 229 (Balto. City Cir. Ct. May 16, 1963).
In this case, the court issued an injunction preventing the majority shareholder
from issuing nonvoting stock for the sole purpose of perpetuating the majority's
control. The court held that this was not a sufficient purpose to permit the major-
ity to act to the detriment of the minority. The court believed that the phrase
"legitimate business purpose" should not include the intent to continue the busi-
ness for the sole benefit of the majority shareholder. But see Dower v. Mosser
Indus., Inc., 648 F.2d 183, 188-91 (3d Cir. 1981) (the court recognized that contin-
uing the business for the sole benefit of the majority was not a legitimate business
purpose but permitted the freeze out, reasoning that a merger could not be en-
joined absent a showing of "fraud or fundamental unfairness").
Similarly, a merger solely to eliminate the minority interest should not be
considered a legitimate business purpose. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d
969, 980 (Del. 1977). "[T]he dominant corporation, or a majority shareholder
standing. . . under. . . a merger transaction, has the burden of establishing its
entire fairness to the minority stockholders sufficiently to pass the test and careful
scrutiny by the courts." Id at 976. If either of the two above reasons was a "legit-
imate business purpose" for a merger, the imposition of a fiduciary duty on the
majority shareholder would be for naught because the majority shareholder
would always have a legitimate purpose and would never breach his fiduciary
duty to the minority shareholders.
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forming a holding company in which to place all stock, and exchanging
his shares in the public corporation for shares in the holding com-
pany.26 The holding company then votes the shares in the public cor-
poration to merge with it. When the public corporation is merged with
the holding company the minority interests usually accept cash in ex-
change for their shares.27 Judge Miller ruled in Twenty Seven Trust
that in the limited situation when a corporation goes private, the major-
ity shareholder owes a fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder.28
The rationale seems to be that when a public corporation seeks to go
private, the main concern of the majority shareholder is personal bene-
fit; therefore, absent a fiduciary duty, the majority shareholder will not
have an incentive to protect the minority.
The Maryland district court's imposition of a fiduciary duty upon
the majority shareholder is an important first step in providing an ade-
quate remedy for the frozen out minority shareholder. The minority
shareholder in Maryland will now be able to bring suit and enjoin ca-
pricious conduct by the majority shareholder which has no legitimate
business purpose or is unfair to the minority.29 Implicit in the court's
rationale is that the imposition of a fiduciary duty is justified by the
need to supplement the currently inadequate remedies available to the
frozen out minority. Additionally, imposition of the duty protects sev-
eral interests of the minority shareholder.
Often the main concern of a minority shareholder, such as Twenty
Seven, is to avoid being excluded from participation in the benefits
arising out of the stock ownership, including receiving dividends and
voting on management decisions. The legitimate business purpose test
seems to adequately protect this concern by requiring the majority
shareholder to show a legitimate purpose for the merger, thereby pro-
tecting the minority from arbitrary exclusion by the majority. This test
also appropriately balances the majority's right to control with the mi-
nority's need for protection while providing resort to courts of equity in
the case of disagreement.
In addition, the imposition of a fiduciary duty upon the majority
shareholders is important in allocating who bears the burden of prov-
ing a breach. Generally, when a beneficiary advances a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty and shows a benefit to the fiduciary, then the
fiduciary bears the burden of proving the fairness of the transaction.3°
In a case such as Twenty Seven Trust, the minority shareholder would
bear the burden of showing that the majority owns controlling interest
26. Brudney & Chirelstein,A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354,
1370 (1978).
27. Id at 1365.
28. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039.
29. See id
30. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977); McDaniel v. Hughes, 206
Md. 206, 220, 111 A.2d 204, 210 (1955); see also Trusts and Estates, 21 M.L.E.
§ 134 (1960 & Supp. 1983).
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in both corporations and, therefore, is on both sides of the trans-
action.31 The burden would then shift to the majority shareholder
to show a legitimate business purpose and the fairness of the
transaction.32
The imposition of a fiduciary duty upon the majority shareholders
may be further justified by the inadequacies of the statutory remedy
provided for the protection of the minority. Maryland's statutory ap-
praisal remedy provides for the minority shareholder to receive "fair
value" for his stock.33 To so limit the remedy of minority shareholders
assumes that the only value they have in their shares is to be paid fair
value.34 However, the minority shareholders' interest goes beyond fair
value, as the Twenty Seven Trust case indicates. The value of the stock,
according to Twenty Seven, was the federal tax loss carryforward.35
This tax loss carryforward was considered of even greater value to
Twenty Seven than the control price premium offered to it.36 More-
over, the difficulty in making a statutory appraisal of a federal tax loss
carryforward makes any determination of the stock's fair value suspect.
The statutory appraisal of the stock may be further complicated by the
difficulty minority shareholders may have in obtaining access to corpo-
rate records controlled by the majority shareholder.
37
31. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 976 (Del. 1977).
32. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039. A shift in the burden of proof seems
entirely appropriate in the case of a controlling shareholder who is accused of
breaching his fiduciary duty to the minority shareholder because: (1) he has con-
trol and access to the corporate records; and (2) he is in a better position to prove
a legitimate business purpose. This allocation of the burden of proof is a signifi-
cant departure from the current fiduciary duty imposed upon the directors of a
corporation. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). On
the other hand, a director is protected by the business judgment rule which
presumes sound judgment when any rational business purpose may be attributed
to the conduct. Id at 293. To overcome this presumption a plaintiff would have
to show that "impermissible motives predominated in the making of the decision
in question." Id at 294. Such a heavy burden of proof-may be entirely appropri-
ate with respect to directors of corporations, but any such presumption of a busi-
ness purpose imputed to the controlling shareholder would nullify the
consequences of an imposition of a fiduciary duty. See id "[B]y the very nature
of corporate life, a director has a certain amount of self-interest in everything he
does. The very fact that the director wants to enhance corporate profits is in part
attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that they will not oust
him." Id In addition, the justification for presuming sound business judgment
on the part of directors is not present in the case of a controlling shareholder. A
controlling shareholder has no inherent conflict of interest.
33. MD. CoP.us. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. §§ 3-201 to -212 (1975 & Supp. 1983).
34. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 (Del. 1977).
35. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039.
36. Id
37. If the only available remedy to a frozen out minority shareholder is an appraisal
of the fair value of his stock, there seems little to deter a majority shareholder
from attempting to freeze out the minority, since his liability is limited to payment
of fair market value. If, however, a claim for breach of fiduciary duty is permit-
ted, it may result in greater damages assessed against the majority shareholder,
thus serving to deter majority shareholders from engaging in egregious behavior.
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Twenty Seven Trust goes further than the earlier Maryland com-
mon law and explicitly recognizes the right of the majority sharehold-
ers to bring a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against the majority
shareholder.38 However, as Judge Miller points out, the majority
shareholder does have defenses to this newly-recognized claim of
breach of fiduciary duty.39 One such defense is that a legitimate busi-
ness purpose exists for the merger.' An example of a legitimate busi-
ness purpose, as determined by the benefit to the majority shareholder,
might include a merger when the majority shareholder intends to use
the newly merged assets in order to obtain debt financing.4" The bene-
fit to the controlling shareholder in such a situation would seem to be
legitimate. Another legitimate business purpose is the economic gains
realized b not duplicating corporate functions once the merger is
complete.4
The court's reasoning in Twenty Seven Trust, however, should not
be limited to its facts, but expanded in future decisions to include all
freeze outs attempted by controlling shareholders. In Title Four corpo-
rations, for example, the concept of fiduciary duty should be expanded
to protect the frozen out minority shareholders. 43 Title Four corpora-
tions are usually small with stockholders who have invested their life-
savings to start a business. Thus, although a freeze out may be more
difficult to accomplish in a Title Four corporation," the consequences
of the freeze out are often much greater because a minority shareholder
who has risked everything may be left with nothing.45
38. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039.
39. Id; see also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
40. Twenty Seven Trust, 533 F. Supp. at 1039; Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969
(Del. 1977).
41. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121, 1124 (Del. 1977).
42. Id
43. See MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. § 4-201 (1975 & Supp. 1983). Corpora-
tions formed under this section will be referred to as Title Four corporations.
Although a Title Four corporation may have many of the attributes of a judicially
defined close corporation, iLe., small number of shareholders, the Title Four cor-
poration is a statutory creation. Thus, in Maryland the only corporations which
may be distinguished are those incorporated under the General Statute of Incor-
poration, id. § 2-102, and those formed under Title Four.
44. See id. §§ 4-201(b)(2)(ii), 4-203, 4-401(b), 4-501, 4-504(b), 4-601. These provi-
sions essentially provide that all major corporate moves or changes in corporate
form be approved unanimously by all the shareholders. However, one method
the majority might employ to freeze out the minority would be to deprive the
minority of employment in the Title Four corporation. In a Title Four corpora-
tion most of the profits are paid out in the form of salaries, thus depriving the
minority of substantial participation in the benefits of stock ownership. See, e.g.,
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976).
45. In addition to the fiduciary duty imposed upon majority shareholders in Title
Four corporations, the majority shareholder may also owe a fiduciary duty to the
minority in the merger of affiliate corporations. This type of merger occurs most
frequently when a large corporation owns a controlling interest in a smaller one.
The large corporation will vote for a merger when the economic benefit to it is the
greatest. The minority shareholders will usually be forced to accept cash for their
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This expansion of the concept of fiduciary duty is also necessary to
fill in gaps in the federal securities laws created by the Supreme Court's
restriction of the scope of rule lOb-5." In addition, to confine the
fiduciary duty to cases involvig mergers is unrealistic, because many
freeze outs occur without one.' For example, a majority shareholder
may issue more stock knowing that the minority cannot afford to
purchase it." The fiduciary duty would require a showing that a legiti-
mate business purpose for the issuance of more stock exists and that the
issuance was fair. If the majority cannot show such a purpose, then
there seems to be no reason to permit the merger.
Judge Miller's decision in Twenty Seven Trust was the first Mary-
land case to specifically find that the majority shareholders owe the
minority shareholders a fiduciary duty. This duty requires the majority
to show a legitimate business purpose and that the transaction is fair to
the minority. In future decisions, the Maryland courts should expand
the concept of fiduciary duty to include controlling shareholders in all
interest. Thus, in the merger of affiliates the majority shareholder should owe the
minority a fiduciary duty, requiring proof that there was a legitimate business
purpose for the merger and that such action was fair. Brudney & Chirelstein, A
Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1370 (1978). Absent
such a fiduciary duty there is little to protect the minority shareholder from the
whim of the controlling shareholder. In other situations, the imposition of a
fiduciary duty on the majority shareholder in a merger may be limited by the
relationship of the corporations. Id In the traditional setting for a merger, two
nonaffiliated corporations merge to form one. Id Because of the merger's
financial benefit to each corporation, the minority does not need protection. In
this limited setting the majority shareholder should not owe a fiduciary duty to the
minority. Id The minority does not need the fiduciary duty for protection and
the imposition of a duty is an unnecessary burden on the majority shareholder.
46. Traditionally, rule lob-5 has been used as an all-purpose remedy for material mis-
statements in connection with the purchase and sale of securities. See, e.g., Santa
Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (the Court refused to permit a cause of
action for breach of fiduciary duty under rule lOb-5); Chiarella v. United States,
445 U.S. 222 (1980) (the Court rejected the idea that a person may incur liability
under rule lob-5 for failure to disclose information because of the person's posi-
tion as a "market insider"). But cf. Huddelstein v. Herman & MacLean, 103 S.
Ct. 683 (1983) (Supreme Court, for the first time, recognized that a implied private
right of action exists under rule 10b-5). Prior to Hudde/stein the Court seemed to
be hostile toward actions brought under rule lOb-5. Perhaps Huddelstein indicates
a future expansion in the scope of the rule.
47. See, e.g., Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass. 842, 353 N.E.2d 657
(1976). The court found a breach of fiduciary duty when the majority sharehold-
ers voted Wilkes out of his director position with no legitimate business purpose.
Thus, Wilkes, as a minority shareholder, was unlikely to receive any benefit of
stock ownership since in a judicially defined close corporation one of the main
benefits is employment. Id at 849, 353 N.E.2d at 662.
48. See Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1975) (the issuance of
more stock at a time clearly advantageous to those in control, and without a busi-
ness justification, violated the majority shareholder's fiduciary duty to the minor-
ity shareholder).
[Vol. 12
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corporations. In addition, the controlling shareholder should owe the
minority a fiduciary duty regardless of how the freeze out occurs.
Bryan D. Bolton
